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��ࡱ�>�� u �r��cbjbj�n�n2��a��a�[ ��""��8��}$�\rl��q�q�q�q�q�q�q$�s�~v<r��r��4r###��q#��q###��8�0y��c#�q,r0\r#�v��v##p2�v�snt��#��rr��\r��v��"qs: governance volume 37, issue 3, july 2024 1. title: pacified citizens with a marketized school system: causal evidence of boomeranging effects of user choice authors: johan wejryd abstract: the marketization of schools and of other public services is supposed to have changed the relationship of citizens to the state in many western countries over the last 30 years. one explicit aim of marketization has been to increase citizen influence over public services. yet, studies of its effects on citizens' willingness to address public decision-making remain scarce in general, and nonexistent as regards schools. in this study, a survey experiment taps the causal effects of both user choice and private provision. the results show that marketization significantly reduces respondents' intention to influence schools and related political and bureaucratic decision-making. the effects are robust and, in contrast to those of previous studies, driven by significant effects from the user choice introduced in connection with marketization. the pacifying effects recorded suggest that marketization potentially reduces public services' responsiveness to citizens' interests, thereby aggravating the problems it was meant to address. 2. title: towards a multifaceted measure of perceived legitimacy of participatory governance authors: tessa haesevoets, arne roets, kristof steyvers, bram verschuere, bram wauters abstract: policy decision-making modes in governance contexts have become increasingly participatory. this raises questions about legitimacy, and how to measure this concept. the current article advances a multifaceted measurement of perceived legitimacy of policy decision-making modes in participatory governance, capturing the three components of legitimacy (input, throughput, and output) with two items each. this six-item measure was tested in a vignette survey (total n = 4583), which was administered among four types of democratic stakeholders: politicians, civil servants, civil society, and citizens. respondents completed the scale for four different policy decision-making modes (representative, consultative, co-decisive, and decisive). our six-item scale shows excellent internal consistency as an encompassing measure, while at the same time also allowing for fine-grained analyses on difference patterns in the input, throughput, and output components of legitimacy. as such, it provides a relevant and parsimonious tool for future research that requires a multifaceted measurement of the perceived legitimacy of participatory governance. 3. title: incentives, audits and procurement: evidence from a district-level field experiment in ghana authors: elaine k. denny, ngoc phan, diego romero, erik wibbels abstract: there is growing affinity for audits as a tool to promote political accountability and reduce corruption. nevertheless, knowledge about the mechanisms through which audits work remains limited. while most work on audits shows that they can work via citizen sanctions of bad performers, we emphasize that audit effects can also run through prospective incentives, that is, the desire to avoid poor audit results in the first place. we distinguish audits' impact on prospective incentives and sanctions using a field experiment in ghana; districts were randomized into audit treatment conditions targeting district procurement and oversight of development projects. we assess the effect of audits on political officials using survey experimental data and show that officials respond powerfully to prospective incentives. in districts treated with top-down audits, in-party favoritism falls from 60 percent at baseline to 20 percent at midline, and rates remain at 19 percent at endline. this suggests that the audit's main effect occurred before the audit results were made public, and that prospective mechanisms play an important role in audit efficacy. 4. title: disgruntled cadres: how tax reduction undermines rural governance authors: linke hou, mingxing liu, xiaobo l� abstract: tax reduction is supposed to garner popular support, yet rural unrest sharply increased following the chinese government's agricultural tax reform aiming to reduce peasants' tax burden. we argue that the tax reduction could undermine village elites' economic and political incentives to assist the state in implementing unpopular policies and achieving desirable outcomes. we exploit the exogeneous timing of the agricultural tax reform that abolished the agriculture tax and estimate its impact through a rare national representative village-level panel dataset. we demonstrate that the tax reform led to tax noncompliance and rising social unrest. we further show that local governance worsened because village elites were disincentivized from carrying out state-preferred yet unpopular policies. 5. title: determinants of the cabinet size in presidential systems authors: adri�n albala, paula clerici, alejandro olivares abstract: the composition of cabinets under presidential regimes has constituted one of the top topics of the litterature in political science in recent years. however, nothing has been said about the proper size of those cabinets. that is, why some cabinets are 37 ministers large when other is formed by just 13 members? we carry on a theory of cabinet size under presidential regimes, using insights from both parliamentarist and presidentialist literature. our model is composed of five hypotheses relying on an original dataset of 161 observations across 19 presidential countries of the americas. our main finding is that the inclusion of independents and/or technocrats impacts significantly on lowering cabinets' size. 6. title: generating instability? the impact of the eu's hybrid migration governance in turkey, lebanon and jordan authors: luke cooper, maissam nimer abstract: this article analyses the migration agreements between the european union (eu) and turkey, lebanon and jordan. these international policy frameworks were negotiated in tandem with one another, and all were announced in 2016. drawing on fieldwork conducted in the three countries, the article argues that they fuse humanitarian elements with a bloc-based security logic in an ad-hoc mix that lacks substantive legitimacy in the three states, rendering the frameworks unstable. the article introduces the idea of hybrid migration governance which we have developed inductively to conceptualise the empirical findings from our fieldwork, building on existing work on hybridity in the conflict and security studies literature and nora stel's conception of governance as the ability to shape the field of action of others. in our usage, hybrid migration governance refers to the efficacy of eu intervention in the institutional management of migration in the three case study countries (�shaping the field of action�), the �frozen� character of the societal relations formed through this process and their underlying lack of domestic legitimacy. in conclusion, we argue that hybrid migration governance poses problem for the eu's �barcelona� conception of human security, because rather than expanding the bloc's �zone of security� to the international neighbourhood, these policies have generated downstream security-risks. 7. title: unpack the black box of pilot sampling in policy experimentation: a qualitative comparative analysis of china's public hospital reform authors: alex jingwei he, yumeng fan, rui su abstract: governments increasingly use policy experimentation programs to seek solutions for complex problems. because randomization and controllability are unrealistic for real-world policy experiments, how subnational pilots are selected is crucial for generating sound evidence for national replication. however, the received wisdom on pilot sampling is thin and paradoxical. while some studies suggest that policymakers prefer to select regions with favorable conditions, others contend that securing representativeness remains the principal concern when it comes to pilot selection. this study resolves the paradox by elucidating the logic of selecting pilots in large policy experimentation programs. we focus on china's huge public hospital reform program and through a novel research design that combines comparative qualitative analysis and illustrative case studies we seek to explain the strategy for pilot selection. our analyses reveal five distinctive pathways of pilot sampling: piloting for challenge, piloting for advancement, piloting for innovation, piloting for action, and piloting for regional generalization. each modality represents a specific experimental purpose. we reveal that piloting serves as a versatile governance tool that can fulfill multiple functions in complex reforms. 8. title: symbolic effects of representative bureaucracy in policing: an experimental replication in a korean context authors: sunyoung pyo abstract: this study experimentally examines the effect of gender representation of a police organization responsible for handling domestic violence, and how this impacts korean citizens' views toward the police. findings show that male participants gave the highest ratings of legitimacy and fairness when the organization is equally represented by men and women, while gave low ratings of legitimacy and efficacy to the organization where women are over-represented. this implies that achieving gender balance in job assignments helps ensure the effectiveness of representative bureaucracy. on the other hand, female participants rated organization with equal representation positively only when they also demonstrated a high level of active representation for female victims. given heightened gender conflict within korean policing, female citizens might try to maintain objectivity about female officers. 9. title: are the answers all out there? investigating citizen information requests in the haze of bureaucratic responsiveness authors: julia trautendorfer, lisa schmidthuber, dennis hilgers abstract: under freedom of information (foi) regulations, public officials are pressured to grant citizens access to public information by responding to citizen information requests. however, despite foi regulations, information requests are treated with varying bureaucratic attention, resulting in a high number of ignored or overdue requests by public organizations. focusing on this bureaucratic discrimination, this study aims to explain the determinants of varying bureaucratic responsiveness to citizen information requests. responsiveness in this case is therefore either a successful response to the request, a refusal to respond to the request, or no response at all (i.e., the request is ignored). by drawing on public accountability, and thus a citizen-driven model of bureaucratic responsiveness, we shed light on the human aspect behind responsiveness to information requests. this research argues that the request's topic as an accountability-seeking indicator and the communication tone as an indicator for underlying emotions influence responsiveness. the results from applying text mining and text analysis techniques, such as topic modeling and sentiment analysis, on over 100,000 citizen information requests filed via a german online foi platform support these assumptions. 10. title: fueling conspiracy beliefs: political conservatism and the backlash against covid-19 containment policies authors: yesola kweon, byeonghwa choi abstract: amid the covid-19 pandemic, people have witnessed a deluge of conspiracy theories and disinformation. as the coronavirus poses a significant threat to individuals' lives, these conspiracy theories are dangerous, as they erode public trust and undermine government efforts to fight the virus. this paper examines the political determinants of covid-19 conspiracy beliefs. particularly, we analyze how government policy responses to the pandemic and individuals' ideological predispositions interact to shape people's tendencies to believe conspiracy theories. using survey data from 22 advanced industrial countries, we show that political conservatives are more prone to conspiracy beliefs than liberals. more importantly, this tendency is reinforced when the government adopts stringent containment policies. our results suggest that governments' policy efforts to contain the coronavirus can trigger an unintended backlash from political conservatives. this study has important implications for the behavioral and attitudinal effects of government containment policies that are often overlooked. 11. title: the home state effect: how subnational governments shape climate coalitions authors: jonas meckling, samuel trachtman abstract: organized business interests often seek to block public interest regulations. but whether firms oppose regulation depends on institutional context. we argue that, in federal systems, sub-national policies and politics can have a home state effect on firms' national policy preferences and the lobbying coalitions they join. state policies that force firms to absorb regulatory cost can reduce the marginal cost of national policies, leading to preference shifts. in addition, firms regulated at the state level have incentives to strategically align with their state governments to avoid future regulatory cost. we test our argument in the context of u.s. climate politics, matching original data on the positions of electric utilities toward the clean power plan and data on ad hoc coalition membership with data measuring state policy stringency and state government positions. quantitative evidence is consistent with hypotheses: both state policies and state politics influence utilities' positions on national climate policy. qualitative evidence from elite interviews helps clarify the roles of different mechanisms. our findings underscore the importance of sub-national governments in shaping national lobbying coalitions. 12. title: not separate, but certainly unequal: the burdens and coping strategies of low-status street-level bureaucrats authors: gabriela lotta, morgana g. martins krieger, nissim cohen, charles kirschbaum abstract: the literature has usually regarded street-level bureaucrats (slbs) as relatively privileged bureaucrats, neglecting an important sub-group of these civil servants: low-status slbs. even though they may be members of a team with other slbs who have more status, they may suffer from intraorganizational inequality, meaning unequal access to resources and the requirement that they perform informal tasks associated with their unequal position in the organization. we examine the unique challenges low-status slbs are often confronted with, and how they cope with them. based on 94 interviews with community health workers in brazil, we identify several types of burdens associated with their ambiguous tasks, as well as the strategies they use to cope with these burdens. the analyses suggest that the burdens and coping strategies are an important source of the inequality on the team. the paper discusses the importance of considering the diversity of roles occupied by slbs and the inequalities within teams. 13. title: policy growth, implementation capacities, and the effect on policy performance authors: xavier fern�ndez-i-mar�n, markus hinterleitner, christoph knill, yves steinebach abstract: democratic governments have constantly added new policies to existing policy stocks to confront societal, economic, and environmental challenges. this development has the potential to overburden public administrations in charge of policy implementation. to address this issue, we theorize and analyze how the relationship between the size of sectoral policy portfolios and implementation capacities affects sectoral policy performance. our bayesian analysis of the environmental policies of 21 organisation for economic co-operation and development countries from 1976 to 2020 reveals a widening �gap� between the policies up for implementation and the implementation capacities available and shows that this gap negatively affects environmental policy performance. qualitative insights from 47 in-depth interviews with implementers validate these findings and shed light on the underlying causal processes. our findings suggest that in advanced democracies transforming additional policies into effective problem-solving crucially hinges on the deliberate expansion of implementation capacities. 14. title: the origins and consequences of administrative burdens in mass immunization programs: experimental evidence based on the monkeypox outbreak authors: youlang zhang, huan wang abstract: studies in medicine, bioscience, psychology, sociology, and public health have provided various contextual, individual, and vaccine-specific explanations for vaccine uptake. however, one significant yet often ignored fact is that vaccination could be viewed as a site of citizen-state interaction in implementing public vaccination policy. this begs the questions: what barriers create administrative burdens in vaccination? how do the experiences of administrative burdens (i.e., the learning, psychological, and compliance costs in citizen-state interactions) shape the public's willingness to vaccinate? according to theoretical insights drawn from the extant literature on administrative burden and vaccine uptake, this study uses a conjoint experiment design based on a representative sample of china to reveal the role of administrative burdens in shaping the public's willingness to vaccinate against the monkeypox outbreak, a �public health emergency of international concern� from july 2022 to may 2023. the experimental results suggest that multiple salient barriers have distinct effects on the respondents' learning, psychological, and compliance costs, thus significantly influencing their vaccine uptake. these findings have important implications for both future research and efforts to promote mass immunization programs. 15. title: patronage, tournament, and political reward: evidence from the model county party secretary in china authors: wenchi wei, wen xu, wenzhao li abstract: this study focuses on the honor of model county party secretary, a prestigious award bestowed by the communist party of china to recognize exceptional county party secretaries. specifically, we investigate how county party secretaries' patronage networks with senior politicians and their relative economic performance compared to other political contestants can impact their likelihood of winning this honor. we collect demographic and biographic data on a sample of over 2000 county party secretaries from various official documents and online sources. instrumental variable estimations show that, in line with tournament theory, an increase in county party secretaries' relative economic performance enhances their likelihood of receiving the honor. however, county leaders' patronage networks with senior politicians negatively moderate the estimated impact of economic performance. this finding contradicts the inference drawn from patronage theory but supports the conjecture that senior politicians may exploit patronage networks to politically suppress subordinate leaders and prevent political uncertainty. 16. title: politicization, bureaucratic closedness in personnel policy, and turnover intention authors: kohei suzuki, hyunkang hur abstract: previous studies have identified individual and organizational factors that influence the turnover intentions of bureaucrats. however, they have overlooked how the type of national bureaucracy influences turnover intention. combining data sets on macro-level bureaucratic structures and individual civil servants, we examine how bureaucratic politicization and closedness are associated with the turnover intentions of bureaucrats in 36 countries. our analysis indicates that there is large cross-national variation in turnover intention, and that bureaucratic structures matter as one of the predictors of turnover intention. public servants working in more closed and regulated bureaucracies exhibit lower turnover intention. we also find that public servants working in more politicized bureaucracies (in which personnel decisions are made via political connections) have lower turnover intention than those working in more merit-based systems. such low turnover intention in politicized bureaucracies may be explained by the characteristics of patronage appointments in which public jobs are distributed based on personal or political loyalty. 17. title: police corruption and crime: evidence from africa authors: robert gillanders, idrissa ouedraogo, windkouni haoua eugenie ma�ga, doris aja-eke abstract: using data from the afrobarometer surveys, this paper finds that people living in regions in which police corruption is more prevalent are more likely to report that they or someone in their family have been victims of physical assault. people living in more corrupted regions are also more likely to report that they or someone in their family has had something stolen from their home. we find no statistically significant gender differences in the average marginal effects. controlling for the incidence of corruption in other domains reduces the size of the estimated association but does not render it insignificant in terms of statistical significance or magnitude. non-police corruption is also strongly associated with an increased risk of crime. for both types of crime, the evidence points to �transactional� police corruption (having to pay bribes to get help) rather than �predatory� police corruption (having to pay bribes to avoid problems) as driving the relationship. finally, we show that, controlling for whether the respondent reports being a victim of either type of crime, police corruption predicts an increase in the probability that the respondent reports feeling unsafe while walking in their own neighborhood thus imposing a cost even on those who have not been victims. 18. title: mudding the playing field. fiscal contributions to municipalities as a political construction authors: paula clerici, luc�a demeco, franco galeano, juan negri abstract: in federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. with original data, in this study we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (atn) to the argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997�2000 and 2016�2019. we show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor's political alignment. indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the president oppose the provincial governor. by this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the president considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. furthermore, we find that the executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the president's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition. #&()*,5��ǵǵǵ��{n`re`:rhicy5�ojqj^jhj�5�ojqj^jo(h�q�h�q�5�ojqj^jh�"�hu<�5�ojqj^jh�ud5�ojqj^jo(h�"�h�"�o(&h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jajo(h!@�5�cjojqj^jajh 2e5�cjojqj^jaj#hr�hr�5�cjojqj^jaj#h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jaj&ht_�h$-�5�cjojqj^jajo(#ht_�ht_�5�cjojqj^jaj)* ��- � p�<=��"\3��gd�psgd)w�gd$?�gdto�gd�l$gd%j,gdu<�gd�"�$a$gdt4$a$gdt_��, - 5 6 w � � � � 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