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��ࡱ�>�� uw����t��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������u �r��cbjbj�n�n2b��a��a�9 �������""������������8�d]�olyyyyy���n�n�n�n�n�n�n$�p�:sf�n-�������n��yy4�n�����y�yn��n���y�������<���������kn�n0o��s�l�s���0�s��k����������n�n����o�������������������������������������������������������������������������s���������"q s: governance volume 35, issue 3, july 2022 1. title: unimplementable by design? understanding (non-)compliance with international monetary fund policy conditionality authors: bernhard reinsberg, thomas stubbs, alexander kentikelenis abstract: why do governments fail to implement policy commitments in contractual agreements with international organizations? while scholars have scrutinized domestic factors as obstacles to compliance, we argue that reform programs may be unimplementable by design. we study this hypothesis in the context of international monetary fund (imf) programs, in which borrowing countries must commit to far-reaching economic policy reforms for access to credit. we collect detailed compliance data on individual policy conditions to assess the determinants of compliance failures of imf programs from 1980 to 2009. controlling for a host of borrower-specific variables, features of the loan, unexpected shocks during implementation, donor influence, and bureaucratic interest, we find that the number of conditions is a robust predictor of implementation failure. our theoretical explanation for these findings is that over-ambitious program designs are the result of intra-organizational bargaining within the imf bureaucracy. while an area department within the imf drafts the initial reform program, functional departments use their amendment power to include policy conditions that they care about, without due consideration of local circumstances, which leads to over-ambitious programs. these findings have important implications for theories of compliance as well as for policymaking in international organizations. 2. title: court performance and citizen attitudes toward fighting corruption authors: let�cia barbabela, miquel pellicer, eva wegner abstract: this article investigates the relationship between court performance and citizen attitudes toward corruption. we develop a framework inspired by signaling theory that focuses on the need for institutional actors to send credible signals about their commitment against corruption if they seek to engage citizens. we suggest two channels that link court signals to citizen attitudes, an �institutional channel� linking signals to trust in courts and attitudes about state-driven anti-corruption measures and a �citizen channel� linking signals to citizen efficacy and norms about bribe paying. we investigate these channels with a survey experiment about a fictional court case in low income areas in south africa and tunisia. we find evidence that impartiality and efficiency by courts in corruption cases activate the institutional channel. our findings suggest that courts can play an important role in the fight against corruption, not just by acting as deterrents but by affecting citizen attitudes toward corruption. 3. title: beyond street-level procedural justice: social construction, policy shift, and ethnic disparities in confidence in government institutions authors: inkyu kang abstract: punishment-oriented policy can undermine confidence in government institutions among those who collectively share unfavorable social constructions of the policy's target group, even without having personally experienced negative bureaucratic encounters. as an empirical test, this study investigates the effect of the passage of arizona s.b. 1070 and copycat immigration enforcement laws in five additional states on confidence in the local police. using multi-year survey data from the pew research center, the difference-in-differences analyses demonstrate that these laws had a substantially more negative influence on confidence in police effectiveness and police use of force among hispanics/latinos compared with the rest of society. given that the implementation of these laws were delayed and ultimately either blocked or restricted by the courts, the findings suggest that ethnic minorities' skepticism toward government institutions may be due not only to poor street-level procedural justice, but also to the unfavorable social constructions embodied in high-profile policy shifts. 4. title: gendered bureaucracies: women mayors and the size and composition of local governments authors: carla alberti, diego diaz-rioseco, giancarlo visconti abstract: while women are underrepresented in politics, recent improvements in women's representation in legislative and executive bodies have spurred academic interest in the effects of electing women on a wide array of outcomes. effects on bureaucracies, however, have received less attention. do women mayors reform local bureaucracies differently than their men counterparts? we take advantage of rich administrative data from chile to explore the effects of having a woman mayor on the size and gender composition of municipal bureaucracies. using a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we find that women mayors reduce the size of local bureaucracies while simultaneously increasing the share of women public employees. our findings thus show that women mayors' approach to bureaucratic reform once in office differs from that of their men counterparts, and contribute to existing research on the consequences of electing women. 5. title: the imperative of state capacity in public health crisis: asia's early covid-19 policy responses authors: wei-ting yen, li-yin liu, eunji won, testriono abstract: preexisting political institutions influence governments' responses to public health crises in different ways, creating national variations. this article investigates how state capacity, a country's fundamental ability to organize bureaucracy and allocate societal resources, affects the timing and configuration of governments' covid-19 policy responses. through comparative case study analysis of five of china's neighboring countries early in the covid-19 crisis, the paper shows that more-capable states (singapore, south korea, taiwan) initiated crisis response faster, mobilized national resources more extensively, and utilized diverse policy tools when the virus risk level was still low. in contrast, low-capacity states (thailand and indonesia) were more reactive in handling the crisis, limited their focus to border-related measures, and were more constrained in the types of tools they could employ. the paper points to the importance of studying the covid-19 response process rather than the outcome (i.e., confirmed cases/deaths) when unpacking the impacts of political institutions in public health crises. 6. title: does local democracy improve public health interventions? evidence from india authors: joan costa-font, divya parmar abstract: health care decisions in many low-income countries often require a close political agency relationship between healthcare decision makers and constituents. this is especially the case for maternal and child care as well as preventative interventions when resources are scarce. this article examines the effect of the introduction of the national rural health mission in india, introducing village health, sanitation and nutrition committees (vhsnc), a self-governance mechanism to strengthen the political agency in village health care decision making. we study the effect of exposure to vhsnc on both maternal and preventative child health care. we find that exposure to vhsnc's increase the utilization of several maternal health care services, but does not systematically increase the uptake of preventive health care. the effect of vhsnc is more intense in larger villages and areas closer to district headquarters, and is driven by an increase in the utilization of the public healthcare network. 7. title: domestic isomorphic pressures in the design of foi oversight institutions in latin america authors: rafael pi�eiro rodr�guez, paula mu�oz, fernando rosenblatt, cecilia rossel, fabrizio scrollini abstract: even though many countries in latin america have adopted foi laws, there are significant differences in the institutional design of foi oversight institutions. most explanations highlight the role of political competition in motivating political actors to design strong de jure foi oversight institutions. the design of foi oversight institutions in chile, peru and uruguay, however, cannot fully be explained by political competition. we show how isomorphic pressures help explain variation in the de jure strength of the foi oversight institutions. our findings highlight the importance of considering domestic constraints on the diffusion of one-size-fits-all models. to analyze each case, we conducted a systematic process-tracing analysis. our in-depth analysis allowed us to assess different theories concerning the specific institutional design of foi oversight institutions. 8. title: is democracy pro-poor? an empirical test of the sen hypothesis based on global evidence authors: yanyan gao, leizhen zang abstract: it has long been hypothesized that democracy benefits the poor, yet solid empirical evidence for this assertion is scarce. this article provides new global evidence regarding the poverty-reduction effect of democracy, which we refer to as the sen hypothesis. a difference-in-differences estimation using cross-national panel data of over 100 countries from 1995 to 2015 shows that democracy reduces poverty, although the size of the effect varies by the poverty line chosen. the results also show that the effects are channeled by entitling more political rights, increasing freedom of speech and the size of middle classes, and improving governmental quality, and are heterogeneous over time and democratization types. 9. title: interest group governance and policy agendas authors: isabel m. perera abstract: this article proposes that the internal political organization of an interest group can shape its policy agenda. in doing so, it recommends that public policy research draw on scholarship on comparative political institutions to identify and theorize how alternative organizational rules, structures, and mechanisms can shape preference formation and expression. for example, confederal interest groups can amplify minority voices, whereas majoritarian groups can silence them. contrasting cases of physician advocacy in mental health policy illustrate how the confederal approach to medical organization in france expanded the influence of a small group of public sector psychiatrists; while the majoritarian, �winner-take-all� approach to medical organization in the united states sidelined their american counterparts in favor of the private sector majority. these findings suggest that the politics of interest-aggregation merit further investigation. 10. title: meet the victim: police corruption, violence, and political mobilization authors: aldo f. ponce, ma. fernanda somuano, rodrigo vel�zquez l�pez velarde abstract: recent literature has analyzed the relationship between governmental corruption and political behavior, focusing on voting turnout (stockemer, lamontagne, & scruggs, 2013). fewer studies have examined the impact of corruption on nonelectoral political participation. this article fills this gap by examining how nonelectoral political participation is influenced by corruption within one of the most important institutions dealing with citizens' welfare and safety: the police. we focus our research on mexico because the effects of police corruption have been increasingly felt in the country in recent decades. we find that experiences of police corruption raise the likelihood of taking the streets to protest. interestingly, we also find that corruption experiences specifically with police bureaucracies lead to greater likelihood of nonelectoral participation through institutional channels. we also report that the combination of police corruption and violent crime alienates citizens from the political sphere. 11. title: foreign aid projects and trust in political institutions authors: mitchell watkins abstract: do foreign aid projects undermine citizens' trust in local and national political institutions? drawing on institutional theories of political trust, i hypothesize that foreign aid projects reduce trust in political institutions by lowering citizens' perceptions of government performance and raising perceptions of corruption. to analyze the impact of aid projects on trust, this article utilizes geolocated survey data on citizens' trust in political institutions from afrobarometer rounds 2�5 (2003�2012) and data on the location of foreign aid projects from aiddata's aid information management systems datasets for nigeria, senegal, and uganda. using a spatial difference-in-difference strategy, the empirical results find that active aid projects are on average associated with decreased trust in the president, parliament, and local government council. an exploratory sectoral analysis suggests that the negative average treatment effect is driven by projects in the transportation, agriculture, education, and civil society sectors. 12. title: messaging about corruption: the power of social norms authors: mattias agerberg abstract: while commonly deployed in anti-corruption programs, corruption messaging has shown limited success. i argue that strategies focusing on injunctive norms (what most people approve of) have been underutilized and could be a feasible way of influencing perceptions in a desirable direction. in two studies fielded in mexico, i first identify a substantial discrepancy between how individuals view the permissibility of corruption and their perceptions of other people's attitudes. in a follow-up preregistered experiment, i leverage this tension by randomly informing a treatment group about people's strong anti-corruption attitudes. the results show that the treatment group became significantly more positive with regard to the attitudes of others. moreover, they report higher interpersonal trust, are less likely view corruption as a basic part of mexican culture, and show lower willingness to bribe. the study contributes to our understanding of corruption as a social phenomenon and provides insights about how to construct effective anti-corruption messages. �n n/ffnċ� 13. title: shock to the system: coups, elections, and war on the road to democratization: by michael k. miller, princeton, n.j.: princeton university press, 2021, 362 pp. $29.95 (paper) authors: michael wahman abstract: the article reviews the book �shock to the system: coups, elections, and war on the road to democratization� by michael k. miller. 14. title: peacekeeping, policing, and the rule of law after civil war: by robert a. blair, cambridge university press, 2020. 225 pp. $28 (ebook) authors: william g. nomikos abstract: the article reviews the book �peacekeeping, policing, and the rule of law after civil war� by robert a. blair.       #&()*,5�����ʹ�ʪʪ��xpcug:uhj�5�ojqj^jo(h�h�5�ojqj^jh�"�hu<�5�ojqj^jh�ud5�ojqj^jo(h�"�h�"�o(&h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jajo(h�n�5�cjojqj^jajh 2e5�cjojqj^jajh `�5�cjojqj^jaj h `�5�cjojqj^jajo(#h�"�h�"�5�cjojqj^jaj h$-�5�cjojqj^jajo(#h `�h `�5�cjojqj^jaj )* 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