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volume 36, issue 1, january 2023
1. title: reversing delegation? politicization, de-delegation, and non-majoritarian institutions
authors: mark thatcher, alec stone sweet, bernardo rangoni
abstract: elected governments and states have delegated extensive powers to non-majoritarian institutions (nmis) such as independent central banks and regulatory agencies, courts, and international trade and investment organizations, which have become central actors in governance. but, far from having resolved the balance between political control and governing competence or removed certain issues from political debate, nmis have faced challenges to their legitimacy by elected officials and sometimes attempts to reverse delegation through �de-delegation�. our special issue studies the politicization of nmis, and then whether, why and how it leads to de-delegation through reducing the formal powers of nmis or increasing controls over them. in this article, we examine how to analyze de-delegation, how politicization of nmis has developed, and how it has affected de-delegation. we underline not only institutional rules that constrain elected officials but also the actions of nmis themselves and their relationships with other nmis as part of multi-level governance systems. we find that politicization has varied, but even when strong, elected officials have not introduced widespread and long-lasting de-delegation; on the contrary, they have frequently widened the powers of nmis. insofar as elected politicians have sought to curb nmis, they have often preferred to use existing controls and non-compliance. finally, we consider the wider implications of the combination of politicization and lack of de-delegation for broader issues of governance such as the division of powers between the elected and unelected and democratic accountability.
2. title: international court curbing in geneva: lessons from the paralysis of the wto appellate body
authors: mark a. pollack
abstract: the 21st century has witnessed a backlash against many international courts (ics). studies of ic backlash have generally taken an optimistic tack, noting that most courts have survived backlash intact or�in the case of the paralyzed appellate body (ab) of the world trade organization (wto)�are likely to do so after a temporary period of slumber. in this context, this paper analyzes the united states' successful effort to paralyze the ab, deriving lessons from this deviant case of backlash against one of the world's most active and independent ics. undertaken in the context of the �reversing delegation� research project, this account is organized in five parts. first, i demonstrate that the creation of the ab was a classic instance of delegation of dispute-settlement power, and that the ab quickly emerged as an active agent of trade liberalization. second, i explore the roots of politicization, noting that dissatisfaction with ab jurisprudence preceded the trump administration, although trump's delegitimation of the ab was more far-reaching than that of his predecessors. third, i examine the administration's use of the veto power to paralyze the ab, an act of de facto de-delegation. fourth, i assess the pushback from the many other wto members that sought to defend the ab, showing how they failed to blunt the us campaign. fifth, i analyze the remarkably successful outcome of the us attack, and draw lessons for judicial independence and the rule of law in international politics.
3. title: the non-reversal of delegation in international standard-setting in finance: the basel committee and the european union
authors: lucia quaglia
abstract: international non-majoritarian institutions (nmis) in finance have proliferated over the last decades. the basel committee on banking supervision (bcbs) is the main international nmi in finance and the european union (eu) is one of its core jurisdictions. despite the far-reaching effects of international banking standards in the eu, especially the basel accords, there has been limited politicization of delegation to the bcbs and no attempt to reverse it. why? by taking a �soft� principal-agent approach, this paper points out two explanatory factors: the composite nature of both the principal and the agent. it also identifies a pattern that can be generalized to other international nmis in finance. thus, following the initial delegation of international standard-setting to the bcbs, this international nmi considerably increased its activities, going beyond what certain elected officials wanted; the response from elected officials was limited to the use of relatively weak ex-ante and ex-post controls, including delayed compliance.
4. title: central bank independence in latin america: politicization and de-delegation
authors: cristina bodea, ana carolina garriga
abstract: in the last three decades, legal delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (cbi) has achieved the status of a global norm of good governance. the recent backlash against this independence is an important but understudied trend. our article analyzes the potential for delegation reversals with a focus on latin america where cbi was effective in maintaining price stability, but placed important policy constraints on governments. we theorize that, in the shadow of the global norm for cbi, the increasing distance in preferences between the government and the central bank, and the procedural hurdles to change the status quo, explain the intensity of challenges to the delegation contract or the delegated agent. an analysis of the frequency of irregular central bank leadership replacements, and instances of politicization and de-delegation show the plausibility of our argument. we also show that, in latin america, reforms de-delegating monetary policy have been small, balancing the needs that justified delegation in the first place, but rolling back the most stringent constraints placed on financing the government.
5. title: national de-delegation in multi-level settings: independent regulatory agencies in europe
authors: bernardo rangoni, mark thatcher
abstract: national politicians in europe have created independent regulatory agencies (iras) with significant powers over markets such as communications and energy. after delegation, they have engaged in institutional politicization of iras and undertaken numerous attempted or actual de-delegations. yet overall de-delegation over the period 2000�2020 has been limited, as many de-delegations have been abandoned, temporary or reversed, and also counterbalanced by extensions of ira powers. the article examines different explanations for this pattern. it looks especially at europeanization, which has operated through normative and particularly coercive mechanisms. eu coercion has involved threats of legal action, monitoring and enforcement of existing eu legal requirements, and eu legislation expanding ira powers and protection. iras are more vulnerable to de-delegation than trustee non-majoritarian institutions because their position can be altered with simple legislative majorities. yet even for such agents, the ability of national politicians to reverse delegation is constrained by multi-level institutional settings.
6. title: the law and politics of transnational rights protection: trusteeship, effectiveness, de-delegation
authors: alec stone sweet, wayne sandholtz
abstract: international trustee courts embody a specific form of delegation, in which state principals confer on such courts the authority to interpret and apply treaties agreed by the states in order to realize specific values and interests. human rights courts help states resolve commitment and enforcement problems that are inherent in human rights treaties. this study seeks to answer the question, what happens when states parties seek to reduce or eliminate the authority of a human rights court? to answer these questions, the article assesses six human rights treaty regimes: the council of europe; the organization of american states; the african union; the economic community of west african states; the east african community; and the southern african development community. the article identifies four types of de-delegation possible with respect to international human rights courts and assesses the extent to which states have sought to de-delegate from them. with one exception (the sadc tribunal), the regimes examined here have so far successfully withstood the challenge of de-delegation.
7. title: trustee strategies, politicization and de-delegation: the case of the european central bank
authors: tobias tesche
abstract: this article shows how the european central bank (ecb) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de-delegation despite experiencing contestation. during the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ecb's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. even though the ecb is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. this article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de-delegation: (i) dualism, (ii) voluntary self-restraint, and (iii) changing the yard stick. it concludes by showing that the ecb has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de-delegation.
8. title: can impact assessments tame legislative drift? event history analysis of modifications of laws across europe
authors: dominik brenner, mih�ly fazekas
abstract: laws should endure and change only if assumed benefits don't materialize over time. yet frequent modifications of laws shortly after their enactment distort this compromise between stability and change. while, impact assessments (ias) are designed to improve the quality of legislation, we know little about ias' impact on legal stability post-enactment. we fill this gap by analysing whether the ex-ante application of ias influences the incidence and frequency of legal modifications. the analysis is based on a complete dataset of more than 2500 laws in france, hungary, italy, and the uk between 2006 and 2012. we apply a comparative event history analysis to account for both first and subsequent modifications. we find across-the-board that ias are associated with legal stability. ias are predicted to have the largest effect when political power changes both in terms of seat shares and party ideology, suggesting that ias can, to some degree, tame legislative drift.
9. title: black and (thin) blue (line): corruption and other political determinants of police killings in america
authors: oguzhan dincer, michael johnston
abstract: police violence is not uncommon in america, and the risk of civilians' being killed by police is considerably higher here than in similar countries, making it a major public health issue. for black americans the risk is significantly higher. in this study, we analyze the political determinants of police killings of black americans, with a specific focus on corruption in american states. our evidence suggests that police can kill black americans with impunity because of a lack of accountability�exemplified by corruption�that is largely determined by political influences. our findings point to ways in which the responsibility for police violence and killings is deeply rooted and influenced by the values of the wider society.
10. title: within the shadow of hierarchy: the role of hierarchical interventions in environmental collaborative governance
authors: lingyi zhou, yixin dai
abstract: existing literature often analyzes the effects of horizontal relationships on collaborative governance, though some scholars have started to recognize the role of hierarchical interventions. this paper identities two poorly examined areas of study. first, there is a lack of empirical studies to understand the diverse impacts of hierarchical interventions on collaborative governance. second, there is little deliberation on how existing horizontal relationships can moderate the effects that hierarchical interventions have on collaborative governance. this paper utilizes environmental collaboration data from the yangtze river delta region in china to estimate the impacts of hierarchical interventions on collaborative arrangements and the contextual effects of horizontal relationships. we find that hierarchical interventions, such as top-down regulations and performance evaluation, enhance the formalization of collaborative arrangements. additionally, horizontal relationships derived from past experiences can moderate the effects of hierarchical interventions, notwithstanding such effects vary among different interventions.
11. title: democracy, public debt transparency, and sovereign creditworthiness
authors: ben cormier
abstract: democratic advantage (da) arguments explicitly and implicitly assume that democracies have more transparent public debt, enhancing sovereign creditworthiness. this study questions the assumed link between transparent public debt practices and democracy in developing countries. it finds that such practices, which are crucial for investors, (a) do not depend on democratic governance and (b) largely erase the effect that da variables regime type, rule of law, and property rights have on creditworthiness. in other words, transparent public debt and democracy should not be assumed to go together, and transparent debt practices affect creditworthiness more than da variables. the findings identify public debt transparency as a statistical and theoretical confounder for current iterations of the da thesis, which must be addressed to better understand the relationship between democratic governance and sovereign creditworthiness. the policy implication is to not assume that transparent public debt practices are only available to democracies.
12. title: sex, gender, and promotion in executive office: cabinet careers in the world of westminster
authors: jennifer curtin, matthew kerby, keith dowding
abstract: this article provides the first analysis of gendered promotion issues for cabinet ministers using most-similar systems design for three �westminster-style� governments: australia, canada, and new zealand. using individual-level data and controlling for biographical, institutional, and country effects we find, in common with earlier literature, that women are more likely to be given less prestigious cabinet posts and be assigned to �feminine� portfolio. using both sequence and event history analysis, we see the careers of men and women starkly diverge. we find that women are less likely to be promoted than men but find no relationship between prestigious portfolio and promotion. however, feminine portfolio assignments decrease the promotion prospects for women yet increase them for men.
13. title: the politics of government reorganization in western europe
authors: julia fleischer, philippe bezes, oliver james, kutsal yesilkagit
abstract: the reorganization of governments is crucial for parties to express their policy preferences once they reach office. yet these activities are not confined to the direct aftermath of general elections or to wide-ranging structural reforms. instead, governments reorganize and adjust their machinery of government all the time. this paper aims to assess these structural choices with a particular focus at the core of the state, comparing four western european democracies (germany, france, the netherlands, and united kingdom) from 1980 to 2013. our empirical analysis shows that stronger shifts in cabinets' ideological profiles in the short- and long-term as well as the units' proximity to political executives yield significant effects. in contrast, conservative governments, commonly regarded as key promoters of reorganizing governments, are not significant for the likelihood of structural change. we discuss the effects of this politics of government reorganization for different research debates assessing the inner workings of governments.
14. title: infrastructural state capacity in the digital age: what drives the performance of covid-19 tracing apps?
authors: luciana cingolani
abstract: in a context where states increasingly complement their physical presence with digital means, the classic idea of infrastructural state power needs reconsideration. the covid-19 pandemic represents an unparalleled opportunity to that end, given the uniformity of one type of digital infrastructural intervention�the offer of contact tracing apps- and its highly varying performance across geographies. against this backdrop, the article seeks to expand traditional discussions on state infrastructural power by testing a series of propositions on the explanatory factors behind tracing apps' emergence and adoption rates. the findings stemming from a pool of 150 countries show no straightforward connection between traditional and digital forms of infrastructural power. they also point at the primacy of governmental trust over financial, institutional, and technological factors�including privacy standards�when explaining high adoption, suggesting that the relational aspect of infrastructural power acquires a proportionally greater weight in the digital era.
15. title: the effects of political design and organizational dynamics on structural disaggregation and integration in norway 1947�2019
authors: ole andreas danielsen, julia fleischer
abstract: in countries with long-standing agency traditions, the creation of new agencies rarely comes as a large-scale reform but rather as one structural choice of many possible, most notably a ministerial division. in order to make sense of these choices, the article discusses the role of political design�focusing on the role of political motivations, such as ideological turnover, replacement risks and ideological stands toward administrative efficiency�and organizational dynamics�focusing on the role of administrative legacies and existing organizational palettes. the article utilizes data on organizational creations in the norwegian central state between 1947 and 2019, in order to explore how political design and organizational dynamics help us understand the creation of agencies relative to ministry divisions over time. we find that political motives matter a great deal for the structural choices made by consecutive norwegian governments, but that structural path dependencies may also be at play.
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16. title: rules: a short history of what we live by. by lorraine daston, princeton: princeton university press. 2022. pp. 384. $29.95 (hardco)
authors: robert a. beauregard
abstract: the article reviews the book �rules: a short history of what we live by� by lorraine daston.
17. title: international perspectives on public administration. by henry t. sardaryan, oxfordshire: routledge. 2021. pp. 124. $47.96 (hbk)
authors: felipe vidal mu�oz
abstract: the article reviews the book �international perspectives on public administration� by henry t. sardaryan.
18. title: democracy administered: how public administration shapes representative government. by anthony michael bertelli, cambridge, ma: cambridge university press. 2021. pp. 246. $25.99 (cloth)
authors: marlene jugl
abstract: the article reviews the book �democracy administered: how public administration shapes representative government� by anthony michael bertelli.
19. title: the new kremlinology: understanding regime personalization in russia. by alexander baturo, and johan a. elkink, oxford: oxford university press, 2021. �65.00
authors: luca anceschi
abstract: the article reviews the book �the new kremlinology: understanding regime personalization in russia� by alexander baturo and jos elkink.
20. title: reimagining the judiciary: women's representation on high courts worldwide. by maria c. escobar-lemmon, valerie j. hoekstra, alice j. kang, and miki caul kittilson, new york: oxford university press. 2021. pp. 201. $67.43 (cloth)
authors: fiona shen-bayh
abstract: the article reviews the book �reimagining the judiciary: women's representation on high courts worldwide� by escobar-lemmon.
21. title: global public governance: toward world government? by sorpong peou, new jersey, london, singapore: world scientific. 2022. pp. 465. $ 88 (cloth)
authors: virak prum
abstract: the article reviews the book �global public governance: toward world government?� by sorpong peou.
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