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volume 111, issue 10, october 2021
1. title: jobs for sale: corruption and misallocation in hiring
authors: weaver, jeffrey.
abstract: corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. this paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. exploiting variation across jobs, i show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. in this setting, the correlation was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires.
2. title: oligopolistic price leadership and mergers: the united states beer industry
authors: miller, nathan h.; sheu, gloria; weinberg, matthew c.
abstract: we study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model's structure. in an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. we simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. these coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under bertrand competition.
3. title: mistakes, overconfidence, and the effect of sharing on detecting lies
authors: serra-garcia, marta; gneezy, uri.
abstract: mistakes and overconfidence in detecting lies could help lies spread. participants in our experiments observe videos in which senders either tell the truth or lie, and are incentivized to distinguish between them. we find that participants fail to detect lies, but are overconfident about their ability to do so. we use these findings to study the determinants of sharing and its effect on lie detection, finding that even when incentivized to share truthful videos, participants are more likely to share lies. moreover, the receivers are more likely to believe shared videos. combined, the tendency to believe lies increases with sharing.
4. title: labor rationing
authors: breza, emily; kaur, supreet; shamdasani, yogita.
abstract: this paper measures excess labor supply in equilibrium. we induce hiring shocks�which employ 24 percent of the labor force in external month-long jobs�in indian local labor markets. in peak months, wages increase instantaneously and local aggregate employment declines. in lean months, consistent with severe labor rationing, wages and aggregate employment are unchanged, with positive employment spillovers on remaining workers, indicating that over a quarter of labor supply is rationed. at least 24 percent of lean self-employment among casual workers occurs because they cannot find jobs. consequently, traditional survey approaches mismeasure labor market slack. rationing has broad implications for labor market analysis.
5. title: neighborhood-based information costs
authors: h�bert, benjamin; woodford, michael.
abstract: we derive a new cost of information in rational inattention problems, the neighborhood-based cost functions, starting from the observation that many settings involve exogenous states with a topological structure. these cost functions are uniformly posterior separable and capture notions of perceptual distance. this second property ensures that neighborhood-based costs, unlike mutual information, make accurate predictions about behavior in perceptual experiments. we compare the implications of our neighborhood-based cost functions with those of the mutual information in a series of applications: perceptual judgments, the general environment of binary choice, regime-change games, and linear-quadratic-gaussian settings.
6. title: projection of private values in auctions
authors: gagnon-bartsch, tristan; pagnozzi, marco; rosato, antonio.
abstract: we explore how taste projection�the tendency to overestimate how similar others' tastes are to one's own�affects bidding in auctions. in first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, to overbid�irrespective of whether values are independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. moreover, the optimal reserve price is lower than the rational benchmark, and decreasing in the extent of projection and the number of bidders. with an uncertain common-value component, projecting bidders draw distorted inferences about others' information. this misinference is stronger in second-price and english auctions, reducing their allocative efficiency compared to first-price auctions.
7. title: from mad men to maths men: concentration and buyer power in online advertising
authors: decarolis, francesco; rovigatti, gabriele.
abstract: this paper analyzes the impact of intermediary concentration on the allocation of revenue in online platforms. we study sponsored search documenting how advertisers increasingly bid through a handful of specialized intermediaries. this enhances automated bidding and data pooling, but lessens competition whenever the intermediary represents competing advertisers. using data on nearly 40 million google keyword auctions, we first apply machine learning algorithms to cluster keywords into thematic groups serving as relevant markets. using an instrumental variable strategy, we estimate a decline in the platform's revenue of approximately 11 percent due to the average rise in concentration associated with intermediary merger and acquisition activity.
8. title: the effect of -high-tech clusters on the productivity of top inventors
authors: moretti, enrico.
abstract: the high-tech sector is concentrated in a small number of cities. the ten largest clusters in computer science, semiconductors, and biology account for 69 percent, 77 percent, and 59 percent of all us inventors, respectively. using longitudinal data on 109,846 inventors, i find that geographical agglomeration results in significant productivity gains. when an inventor moves to a city with a large cluster of inventors in the same field, she experiences a sizable increase in the number and quality of patents produced. the presence of significant productivity externalities implies that the agglomeration of inventors generates large gains in the aggregate amount of innovation produced in the united states.
9. title: quantifying the supply response of private schools to public policies
authors: dinerstein, michael; smith, troy d.
abstract: school policies that cause a large demand shift between public and private schooling may cause some private schools to enter or exit the market. we study how the policy effects differ under a fixed versus changing market structure in the context of a public school funding reform in new york city. we find evidence of a reduction in private schools in response to the reform. using a model of demand for and supply of private schooling, we estimate that 20 percent of the reform's effect on school enrollments came from increased private school exit and reduced private school entry.
10. title: assortative matching or exclusionary hiring? the impact of employment and pay policies on racial wage differences in brazil
authors: gerard, fran�ois; lagos, lorenzo; severnini, edson; card, david.
abstract: we measure the effects of firm policies on racial pay differences in brazil. non-whites are less likely to be hired by high-wage firms, explaining about 20 percent of the racial wage gap for both genders. firm-specific pay premiums for non-whites are also compressed relative to whites, contributing another 5 percent for that gap. a counterfactual analysis reveals that about two-thirds of the underrepresentation of non-whites at higher-wage firms is explained by race-neutral skill-based sorting. non-skill-based sorting and differential wage setting are largest for college-educated workers, suggesting that the allocative costs of discriminatory hiring and pay policies may be relatively large in brazil.
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