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volume 131, issue 10, oct 2023
1. title: nobel lecture: financial intermediaries and financial crises.
authors: diamond, douglas w.
abstract: the investors will only know how much the bank repays them, not the actual amount the borrower could pay to the bank. the optimal contract between the bank and investors (in this context, depositors) to provide incentives for delegated monitoring is a debt contract issued by the bank promising to pay the depositors. townsend ([50]) assumes contractual commitment to judicial verification of the borrower's cash after a default, reducing borrower payoffs to zero, and subtracting a fixed cost from total investor payoffs. investors and borrowers are risk neutral, but borrowers have no funds of their own, and each investor's spare funds to invest are small relative to the amount needed to fund the borrower's project. the investor can liquidate the collateral if the borrower pays too little, preventing the borrower from absconding with it, or the investor can impose a nonmonetary penalty on the borrower.[2] bankruptcy in the world today is some combination of these two actions.
2. title: multiproduct cost pass-through: edgeworth's paradox revisited.
authors: armstrong, mark; vickers, john.
abstract: edgeworth's paradox of taxation occurs when an increase in the unit cost of a product causes a multiproduct monopolist to reduce prices. we give simple illustrations of the paradox and a general analysis of the case of linear marginal cost and demand conditions, and we characterize which matrices of cost pass-through terms are consistent with profit maximization. when the firm supplies at least one pair of substitute products, we show how edgeworth's paradox always occurs with a suitable choice of cost function. we then establish a connection between ramsey pricing and the paradox in a form relating to consumer surplus.
3. title: information acquisition, efficiency, and nonfundamental volatility.
authors: h�bert, benjamin; la'o, jennifer.
abstract: we analyze efficiency and nonfundamental volatility in a class of generalized beauty-contest economies with endogenous information. as in models of rational-expectations equilibria, agents learn about exogenous states and endogenous aggregate actions. as in models of rational inattention, agents choose their information structures subject to a cost. we identify conditions on information costs that guarantee the existence of efficient or inefficient equilibria; we further identify conditions that guarantee the existence or nonexistence of equilibria with zero nonfundamental volatility. mutual information, the cost typically assumed in rational-inattention models, guarantees the existence of an efficient equilibrium with zero nonfundamental volatility.
4. title: educational attainment and intergenerational mobility: a polygenic score analysis.
authors: rustichini, aldo; iacono, william g.; lee, james j.; mcgue, matt.
abstract: we extend a standard model of parental investment and intergenerational mobility to include a fully specified genetic analysis of skill transmission. the model's predictions differ substantially from the standard model's. the coefficient of intergenerational income elasticity (ige) may be larger than that in the standard model and depends on the distribution of the genotype. the distribution of genetic endowments may be stratified according to income. the model is tested on data, including genetic information, of twins and their parents, estimating how ige is affected by genetic factors and how environment and genes interact. the effect of intelligence is substantially stronger than that of other traits.
5. title: labor market conflict and the decline of the rust belt.
authors: alder, simeon d.; lagakos, david; ohanian, lee.
abstract: no region of the united states fared worse over the postwar period than the rust belt. this paper analyzes how much of its decline can be accounted for by the persistent labor market conflict that characterized rust belt union-management relations. we develop a multisector, multiregion, dynamic general equilibrium model in which labor market conflict leads to strikes, wage premia, lower investment, and lower productivity growth. these lead to shrinking rust belt industries and to workers moving out of the rust belt. labor conflict accounts for half of the decline in the region's share of manufacturing employment. foreign competition plays a smaller role, and its effects are concentrated after most of the region's decline had already occurred.
6. title: sovereign debt ratchets and welfare destruction.
authors: demarzo, peter; he, zhiguo; tourre, fabrice.
abstract: we study an impatient, risk-neutral government that cannot commit to a particular debt path, financed by competitive lenders. in equilibrium, debt adjusts slowly toward a debt-to-income target, exacerbating booms and busts. strikingly, gains from trade dissipate when trading is continuous, leaving the government no better off than in financial autarky, owing to a sovereign "debt ratchet effect." moreover, citizens who are more patient than their government are strictly harmed. we characterize equilibrium debt dynamics, ergodics, and comparative statics when income follows a geometric brownian motion and analyze devices that allow the sovereign to recapture gains from trade.
7. title: multidimensional premarital investments with imperfect commitment.
authors: bhaskar, v.; li, wenchao; yi, junjian.
abstract: we analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in china) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g., men in china), since parents of boys will increase housing investments in order to credibly commit to share more resources with the boy's potential wife, possibly crowding out human capital investments.
8. title: incentives and performance with optimal money management contracts.
authors: pegoraro, stefano.
abstract: i characterize the dynamics of incentives in an optimal contract with investment delegation, moral hazard, and uncertainty about the agent's productivity. the principal increases the agent's incentives after good performance in order to delegate more capital to an agent with higher perceived productivity, thus implementing a convex pay-for-performance scheme. moreover, the principal commits to reduce the agent's future incentives in order to mitigate ex ante investment distortions. methodologically, i provide a duality-based strategy to overcome technical challenges common to continuous-time contracting models with state variables. i also derive a sufficient condition to verify the validity of the first-order approach.
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